I Introduction
Class III gaming, which includes slot machines and other high-stakes games, has become a major source of revenue for Indian tribes. The national revenues from Indian gaming in 2007 were $26.5 billion.' Until 1988, States did not have any authority to regulate gaming on Indian reservations. With the enactment of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), Congress changed the regulation of Indian gaming and expressly granted states limited control over Class III gaming. ' IGRA provides Indian tribes the ability to negotiate with the states to come to an agreement about the procedures governing Class III gaming on a tribe's reservation. 3 Congress also put in safeguards for tribes in case states did not want to negotiate or negotiated in bad faith, which allows tribes to bring suit against states. 4 In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 5 the Supreme Court found that Congress did not have the authority to take states' sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. After Seminole Tribe, a tribe's only remedy for a state not negotiating in good faith was to have the state waive its immunity or have the United States bring suit against the state on the tribe's behalf. 6 The Secretary of the Interior (the Secretary) created new procedures for tribes to use when a state did not negotiate or negotiate in good NOTES expressly granted... California ... broad criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians within all Indian country within the State" and a more limited civil jurisdiction. 6 A civil state law only applies to tribes, under Public Law 280, when private civil litigation is brought against "reservation Indians" in state court. 17 The Court found California's law regulating bingo, which the State sought to apply to tribes, was meant to regulate gaming." State laws that regulate, instead of prohibit, are considered civil laws under Public Law 280; therefore, Public Law 280 did not give California the authority to regulate tribal gaming on reservations. 9 The OCCA makes a gambling business operated contrary to state law a violation of federal law. 2 ' The Court determined the OCCA did not give states authority to enforce federal law on Indian reservations, if states could not do so without the OCCA.
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' The Court's rejection of California's two premises of expressly granted congressional authority to regulate tribal gaming on Indian reservations left states with no power to regulate tribal gaming on Indian reservations. 22 After Cabazon was decided, Congress enacted IGRA to give states a limited role in tribal gaming and to establish procedures governing tribal gaming. 2 3
B. The Enactment of IGRA
In 1988, Congress enacted IGRA to give Indian tribes a statutory basis for gaming operations and to allow the federal government to regulate tribal gaming. 24 IGRA established three classes of tribal gaming. 2 5 Class I and H gaming includes social games with "prizes of minimal value," as well as bingo and card games authorized by state law. 26 Class III gaming includes anything that is not Class I or II gaming. 27 16. Id Class I and II gaming activities remain within the jurisdiction of Indian tribes, with Class II gaming also subject to the provisions within Chapter 29. 28 On the other hand, Congress granted states some power with respect to Class III gaming. 29 In addition to the adoption of an ordinance or resolution by the Indian tribe with jurisdiction over the land, and approval by the Chairman of the National Indian Gaming Commission, the Indian tribe and the state where the reservation is located must enter a tribal-state compact for Class III gaming activities to be lawful.
3 " An Indian tribe can enter a tribal-state compact in two ways.
3 ' First, the tribe can request that the state enter good-faith negotiations with the tribe, and the state can agree and enter into a negotiated tribal-state compact.
3 2 Second, the tribe can sue the state after 180 days from the time of the tribe's request for negotiations of a tribal-state compact. 33 For the tribe to bring suit against the state, the parties must not have entered a tribal-state compact and the state must have failed to respond to the tribe's request or failed to negotiate in good faith.
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After a tribe sues the state, the court must determine if the state negotiated in bad faith. "If... the court finds that the State has failed to negotiate in good faith with the Indian tribe to conclude a Tribal-State compact.., the court shall order the State and the Indian Tribe to conclude such a compact within a 60-day period.
3 5 If the state and tribe cannot come to an agreement within the sixty-day period, then each party must submit their last best offer to a court-appointed mediator. 36 The mediator will select the proposition that best meets the terms of IGRA and Chapter 25, and the state can either consent or refuse to consent to the proposition selected. 37 If the state does not consent to the chosen proposal, the Secretary will prescribe procedures, with the consultation of the tribe and based on the mediator's chosen proposal, that will govern the proposed Class III gaming. 
NOTES
Secretary had the authority to enact the procedures for Class III gaming and if they were reasonable. 58 Under the first step of the Chevron test, the district court had to determine if Congress had spoken directly to the disputed issue, which was the Secretary's creation of the procedures to fill the gap left by Seminole Tribe. 5 " The court did not give any analysis for its outcome, and only stated, "[I]n this case, there is no dispute that Congress has not addressed this issue." ' The district court then used the second step of the Chevron test to determine if the Secretary's interpretation was reasonable; if so, deference would be given to the interpretation. 6 The district court first determined the Secretary had authority to promulgate regulations regarding Indian affairs under 25 U.S.C. § § 2 and 9.62 Section 9 gives the President the authority to regulate Indian affairs. 63 The Commissioner of Indian Affairs is delegated, through § 2, the authority to manage all Indian affairs and "all matters arising out of Indian relations.'" Next, the court found the Secretarial Procedures reasonable because the Secretary had authority and the Procedures follow the "compacting and remedy provisions" of IGRA. 65 
B. Issue
The issue this note will focus on is the authority of the Secretary to authorize the Secretarial Procedures and the reasonableness of the Procedures. 66 
IV. Fifth Circuit Rationale
The court avoided the constitutionality issue, and instead, turned to the Chevron test to determine if the Secretarial Procedures were authorized by IGRA. 72 The Chevron test consists of two steps to examine the validity of challenged administrative regulations. 73 The first step determines if a statute is ambiguous or silent concerning the scope of secretarial authority. 74 Step two examines whether the regulations reasonably flow from the statute when viewed in context of the overall legislative framework and the policies that animated Congress's design."
The court quoted the inquiry under Chevron step one as "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." 76 The court began by looking at the plain language of IGRA and noted how 25 U.S.C. § 27 1 0(d)(7)(B)(I)-(vi) only gives the Secretary authority to intervene as a final step after mediation. 77 The court determined that the statute was clear and unambiguous, but went on to address the appellees ' 
NOTES
The court addressed the appellees' claim by explaining why an agency or court cannot assume Congress's intent through unspoken situations. 9 The court stated that "[a]gency authority may not be lightly presumed," because agency power would be too broad and limitless. 80 The court closed its analysis by saying that Congress clearly left the Secretary little remedial authority and the Secretary was inferring too much from what little authority was granted to him."'
The "[a]ppellees further contend[ed] that a judicial decision can, ex post facto, create a Chevron-type 'gap' that introduces ambiguity into the operation of a statutory scheme and thereby authorizes an administrative agency to step in and remedy the ambiguity. 82 The court stated that Chevron requires that the gap be left open by Congress and not made by the court. 8 The court stated that "Congress has the power to confer expansive interpretive authority on agencies to accommodate changing or unpredictable circumstances." 84 The court reasoned that if Congress wanted to confer that type of authority to the Secretary, it knows how to write the statute to permit a flexible interpretation. 5 The court then moved to step two of the Chevron test, stating that even if the Secretary was able to ignore Congress's explicit limitations because of the decision in Seminole Tribe, the Secretarial Procedures would not pass step two.
8 6 Step two requires that the Secretarial Procedures "reasonably effectuate Congress's intent for IGRA. ' s If the Secretary's "choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's care by the statute," a court will not disturb that choice "unless it appears from the statute or legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned." 8 8
The court points out Congress balanced the interests of the states and Indian tribes when it created IGRA. The final claim raised by the appellees was that Secretarial authority is derived from general Indian trust statutes when read with § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii). 94 "[C]ourts may consider 'generally conferred authority [.] '" 95 The court found that the sections the appellees referred to did not grant the Secretary "a general power to make rules governing Indian conduct. Instead, the authority Congress there delegated to the Secretary only allows prescription of regulations that implement 'specific laws,' and that are consistent with other relevant federal legislation." ' 96 In summary, the court used the Chevron test to determine if the intent of Congress was ambiguous, which could give the Secretary the authority to make these Procedures. The court's analysis of steps one and two of the Chevron test made it clear to the court that Congress gave the Secretary limited authority, and the intent of Congress to do so was clear in the statutes. The Fifth Circuit, in its opinion, strictly confined its analysis of the Secretary's authority to the provisions of IGRA.' 0° The court did not address the general authority of the Secretary derived from 25 U.S.C. § § 2 and 9 until after it conducted step two of the Chevron test'6 The court recognized through United States v. Mead Corp. that courts can consider "generally conferred authority" in determining the authority of the Secretary, but the Fifth Circuit found 25 U.S.C. § § 2 and 9 did not give the Secretary general rulemaking power over Indian conduct." 7 Rather, the court said the Secretary only has the power to prescribe "regulations that implement 'specific laws,' and that are consistent with other relevant federal legislation."' 8 The court cited to several cases to illustrate that the Secretary was only relying on the general authority statutes and not prescribing regulations that implemented preexisting rights and laws. ,9 The court used the cases to prove the Secretary cannot create regulations that give Indians rights that were not previously statutorily granted." 0 Mead proves that in a situation where a gap or ambiguity comes up-even if Congress did not intend the result-Congress may expect a certain agency to step in and fill the gap or ambiguity even without expressed authority." 5 The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Texas did not dismiss the fact that the Secretary does have general authority, however, the court found that the Secretary's general authority did not include the power to implement the Class III gaming procedures. " 6 The Supreme Court in Morton v. Ruiz set out the powers of the Secretary by stating:
The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created and funded program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress. In the area of Indian affairs, the Executive has long been empowered to promulgate rules and policies, and the power has been given explicitly to the Secretary and his delegates at the BIA."1 7 From this quote, it is apparent the Secretary is expected and has the power to make rules and policies dealing with Indian affairs. IGRA regulates gaming on tribal lands, an area of Indian affairs.
The main reasoning the court used to find that the general authority statutes did not permit the Secretary to create these Procedures was that IGRA did not guarantee tribes the right to Class II1 gaming, and therefore, the Secretary did not have a statutory right that is required under Mead." 8 Relying on Morton, circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted law, even one about which "Congress did not actually have an intent" as to a particular result. When circumstances implying such an expectation exist, a reviewing court has no business rejecting an agency's exercise of its generally conferred authority to resolve a particular statutory ambiguity simply because the agency's chosen resolution seems unwise, but is obliged to accept the agency's position if Congress has not previously spoken to the point at issue and the agency's interpretation is reasonable. 
34
Chevron gives deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute, and a court, basing its decision on the statue and legislative history, should not overrule an agency's decision unless Congress would not have sanctioned the agency's decision. 35 The court must focus on the reasonableness of the agency's resolution and whether Congress would have sanctioned the resolution; consequently, a court should not reject an agency's decision because it seems unwise. Procedures a tribe can request that the Secretary issue Class III gaming procedures when: (a) the tribe has requested that the state enter negotiations to create a tribal-state compact; (b) a compact has not been negotiated after 180 days, from the tribe's request; (c) the tribe brought suit against the state claiming the state would not negotiate or negotiated in bad faith; (d) the state claimed its sovereign immunity defense; and (e) the court dismissed the actions because of the state's sovereign immunity.1 3 If all of the conditions have been met then the state has the opportunity to comment on the tribe's proposal and affirm whether the proposal violates state laws or if the state even allows the proposed gaming activities by others in the state, and the state may also submit an alternative proposal.
39
The Secretarial Procedures do not provide for a judgment of the state's actions in negotiations with the tribe, but the Secretarial Procedures do provide safeguards to prevent a tribe from bringing frivolous, bad-faith allegations against the state. 40 The state also has the opportunity to tell the Secretary why the tribe's proposal is not in accord with state law or give other reasons why the tribe's proposal should not be accepted.' 4 1 The state then has the ability to submit an alternative proposal.
42
The Secretarial Procedures still give states protection against frivolous claims from tribes. A tribe still has to file a lawsuit in federal court, and the state must claim sovereign immunity before a tribe can call on the Secretary to provide Class III gaming procedures. 4 3 If a state has negotiated in good faith and the tribe is bringing a frivolous claim against the state, then the state may waive its sovereign immunity and allow the court to make a ruling on the matter. If a state chooses to claim sovereign immunity and forego trial, the state still has the ability under the Secretarial Procedures to provide reasons proving the tribe's proposal cannot work in the state or the state can submit an alternative proposal to the Secretary.'" Given the similar nature of the Secretarial Procedures and the provisions of IGRA regarding a good faith determination, Congress would likely sanction this part of the Secretarial Procedures. [Vol. 33 https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol33/iss2/5 NOTES Second, the court finds the Secretarial Procedures to be unreasonable because the Secretary, rather than the court, appoints the mediator."' When a state submits an alternative proposal to the Secretary, the Secretary then appoints a mediator to "resolve differences between the two proposals." ' 6 The mediator selected must not have any "official, financial, or personal conflict of interest with respect to the issues in controversy."' 47 The court claims that because the Secretary has an obligation to "protect the interests of Indian tribes," the mediation process is biased.' 48 The court then stated that "the Secretary cannot play the role of tribal trustee and objective arbiter of both parties' interest simultaneously."' 4 9
The Secretary should not be an "objective arbiter," and she is not; "the person appointed as a mediator is the fair and impartial decider."' 1 5 The Secretary is only selecting the mediator who will preside over the dispute. The mediator is the person who needs to be impartial and is ultimately deciding what proposal best fits the terms of IGRA.1 5 ' The Secretarial Procedures seek to prevent biased decision makers by requiring that the selected mediator not have any conflicts of interest with the issue in controversy. While the Secretary does select the mediator, the process is not as biased as the Fifth Circuit believes. Whether it is a court or the Secretary selecting the mediator, the mediator will be a neutral party.
Third, the court holds that another material difference in the Secretarial Procedures is that the Secretary can disregard the decision of the mediator, as well as the proposals of the state and tribe. 5 The court's main concern is the Secretary has too much power to create her own Class III gaming procedures if she is able to unilaterally reject the proposal chosen by the mediator.' The court did not elaborate on the reasons why it thinks the Secretary has "unbridled power" in prescribing gaming procedures, but it is likely the court is referring to the language of 25 C.F.R. Fourth, the court's final unreasonable difference is the Secretarial Procedures do not require a tribal-state compact. 6 ' The court said the only exception to a tribal-state compact under IGRA is if a court finds the state negotiated in bad faith and the parties went through a court-appointed mediator. 62 63 For all the reasons discussed previously with the first three differences listed by the court, the Secretarial Procedures are about as similar to the provisions of IGRA as possible, without being unconstitutional. After Seminole Tribe there was not an exception to a tribalstate compact. The Secretary, through her agency authority, created a new, yet similar, exception to re-balance the power of tribes and states, after the states were left with a veto power through the availability of a sovereign immunity defense.
In summation, under step two of the Chevron test, the court should have focused on the reasonableness of the Secretarial Procedures and not just the small differences between the Procedures and IGRA. The Secretarial Procedures are not perfect, but they are reasonable and reflect the intent Congress had in enacting IGRA, which is to balance the states' and the tribes' negotiating power so they can work out an agreement.
B. The Need for Congressional Action
The Supreme Court denied certiorari to the parties attempting to appeal this case. As it stands in the Fifth Circuit, tribes do not have any remedy against a state that will not negotiate or negotiates in bad faith and then claims sovereign immunity. Congress's intent was not to give states a vehicle to disallow tribal Class III gaming.' 64 Rather, the intent was to give states limited authority, which they did not have after Cabazon, so they could negotiate with tribes to come to agreements regarding tribal Class III gaming that retained the interests of both parties.1 65 Congress did contemplate creating a federal agency to regulate tribal gaming, but Justice Department officials argued that state agencies had "the expertise to regulate gaming activities and to enforce laws related to gaming ...and thus that there was no need to duplicate those mechanisms on a Federal level."' 6 6 In accordance with Congress's wish to uphold tribal sovereignty, Congress used the tribal-state compacts as a mechanism for allowing the tribe to relinquish aspects of its sovereignty to state jurisdiction. The solutions Congress could use to repair the imbalance of IGRA after Seminole Tribe and Texas could vary widely, but since the Supreme Court has not taken the issue, Congress needs to fill the gap. This note will focus on three possible solutions and discuss whether each one would be in line with Congress's intent for IGRA and the effect each would have on the states and tribes.
First, Congress could adopt the Secretarial Procedures.' 6 8 This would give tribes another approach toward a tribal-state compact. If a state claimed sovereign immunity when a tribe sued, and the court dismissed the action due to the state's sovereign immunity, then the tribe could ask the Secretary to issue Class III gaming procedures.' 69 The Secretary has been willing to take on the task and the Secretarial Procedures reasonably reflect the intent of IGRA, so this would be a good solution. The main problem with this solution is that the Secretary is the trustee for Indian tribes and whether or not there is an actual bias favoring the tribes, there is a perceived bias.
The Secretarial Procedures do differ from the original provisions of IGRA, which were discussed in the analysis of the Fifth Circuit in Texas, and in Subpart A of Part V of this note. The differences will not be re-analyzed, but as covered in the previous subpart, the Secretarial Procedures do reasonably reflect the intent of Congress in IGRA and are similar to the provisions of IGRA with only minor differences.
The adoption of the Secretarial Procedures by Congress would have the most benefit for Indian tribes. The tribes would be the beneficiaries of this option because as it stands now they do not have any course of action to take when a state claims sovereign immunity from an Indian tribe's lawsuit. While the tribes would be the primary beneficiaries, the states would not necessarily lose any rights. The states would have to negotiate with tribes, but this was already a requirement under IGRA. The states originally did not have any right to be involved or regulate gaming on a tribe's reservation under Cabazon. 70 This option still provides states with the privilege to regulate tribal gaming, which did not exist prior to the enactment of IGRA. Overall, the adoption of the Secretarial Procedures would restore states' and tribes' equal bargaining power, thus upholding Congress's original intent behind IGRA. The following modifications that will be discussed take the view of the Fifth Circuit in Texas and do not reflect the analysis of this note. As a threshold matter, Congress would have to require the Secretary to determine if the state negotiated in bad faith before going any further. Next, the selection of the mediator would have to be modified. Congress could either allow the tribe and state to agree on a mediator, possibly leading to unnecessary conflict, or Congress could create a list of acceptable mediators from which the Secretary could choose. Finally, the Secretary would need to have limited discretion when prescribing Class III gaming provisions after the mediator has chosen a proposal. To effectuate this, Congress would need to amend the provision within IGRA forcing the Secretary to base her Class III gaming procedures on the proposal selected by the mediator.
This solution would be in line with the concerns and the decision in Texas, as well as the intent of Congress in IGRA. The Secretary would have an increased role in the process afforded to the tribe when a state does not negotiate or negotiates in bad faith. Although her role would be increased, her power would be limited through the modifications.
Under this solution, there would not be an obvious benefit to either party. The tribes would still have to prove the state negotiated in bad faith, and the mediation process would be neutral. An argument can still be made that the Secretary's increased role in the process would favor the tribes, but with the appropriate safeguards in place, it would be difficult for the Secretary to assert a bias.
Third, another path Congress could take would be to repeal IGRA and revise 18 U.S.C. § I 166(c)(2) to allow Class III gaming without a tribal-state compact. 7 
